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Introduction
 In Latin America, a postcolonial reality of ethnic and cultural exclusion is 
often exacerbated due to neoliberal policies,  which focus on individual 
market growth and promote export-oriented economies. These policies often 
benefit only a select few while oppressing historically marginalized communities 
(Stocks 89-90; Stavenhagen 17-19) .  Latin American countries, disadvantaged 
due to their colonial history, often attempt to gain quick entry into the neoliberal 
global economy by pursuing mega-development projects. 
 These projects, such as dams, bridges, and canals, may boost economic 
growth and attract  foreign investors;  however,  they also exhaust  natural 
resources, permanently damage the local environment, and reduce biodiversity 
(Oliomogbe and Smith 617-618; Ishizawa 58-59).  As a result of dominant 
neoliberal ideologies in Eurocentric and postcolonial states,  governments 
tend to v iew resource- r i ch  indigenous  land as  untapped potent ia l  for 
deve lopmenta l  goals, which often leads to appropriation of indigenous land. 
Indigenous peoples must then defend themselves against government and 
corporate–led development strategies that do not accommodate their values, 
l ifestyles,  and identities (Stavenhagen 18-19).  The usual result is unjust 
exploitation and marginalization of indigenous peoples.
 To examine these processes in depth, this paper analyzes the construction 
of Chile’s Ralco Dam and the planned Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal. The 
actions that led to each of these mega-development projects violated national 
and international law, resulting in the infringement of indigenous rights. 
Applying a postcolonial framework, I argue that these mega-development 
projects erode traditional and spiritual indigenous lifestyles and incorporate 
indigenous peoples into a state they do not identify with. I will then propose 
a bottom-up empowerment strategy based on the wealth of  indigenous 
culture and knowledge to combat future marginalization of indigenous 
communities. This strategy will be supported by the top-down role of international 




 Postcolonialism: Existing inequalities and conflicts in Latin America can 
only be understood through a postcolonial framework that takes into account 
the region’s history and current political, social, and cultural climate. Colonial 
legacies have shaped how postcolonial policies center on the exploitation of 
natural resources, and these legacies are perpetuated by neoliberal strategies 
of export promotion (Cosgrove, “Who Will” 6). The colonial history and 
“historical, economic, and political forces that shape a given society” have 
constructed a reality for indigenous peoples that denies their human and 
collective rights (Cosgrove, “Who Will” 8).
 I n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1 9 8 0 s ,  n e o l i b e r a l  a n d 
macroeconomic policies generally accompanied the transitions from repressive 
authoritarian rule to democratic regimes (Richards 9). “[Neoliberal] reforms 
entailed establishing an export-based economic strategy, opening the economy 
to international  investment,  el iminating trade barriers ,  privatizing state 
industries,  devaluing the currency, and replacing universal social services 
with programs targeting particularly needy sectors” (Richards 9). Typically, 
these reforms strove to enhance the market and individualism within a narrow 
concept of development. States such as Nicaragua and Chile were caught 
inside this “standard box of development solutions” (Richards 79). 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI), defined as the “private capital flows 
in the form of multinational firms purchasing or opening…new subsidiaries 
outside the home economy,” began to stream into Latin America to finance 
neoliberal developmental projects (Montero 55). There is evidence that “countries 
with poor human rights records tend to collect more FDI” (Montero 55). This 
collection results from the stability that a strong government can provide 
to foreign investors,  which is sometimes accomplished through oppression or 
corruption. The influx of foreign money was generally directed towards financing public 
and private sector projects, which were then tailored to fit Eurocentric economic 
regulations,  requirements,  and priorit ies .  As export-based economies in 
Latin America have generally focused on the exploitation of raw materials, 
indigenous territory has become especially valuable to foreign and state interests.
 Chile and Nicaragua both operate within this postcolonial framework 
as both states have been subject  to colonization,  exploitation,  imperial 
intervention, and economic manipulation. The colonial history of direct exploitation, 
and its resulting postcolonial economic dependency, limits Chile and Nicaragua 
to achieve “contemporary development” only by accepting neoliberal development 
policies. To implement such policies, the states adopt colonial priorities by 
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capital izing on indigenous communities in order to reap the resources 
necessary for economic growth. Despite stark contrasts between Chile and 
Nicaragua’s political structures, international relations, national incomes, 
and t iming for  launching their  respect ive  mega-development  pro jects , 
colonial  legacies have exhibited similar effects in both countries.
 Mega-Development Projects: Foreign-funded mega-development projects 
are often marketed by Eurocentric states to periphery states as methods of 
entering the global  economy by s trengthening internal  infrastructure  and 
foster ing internat ional  relationships with elite and affluent global actors. By 
definition, mega-development projects take more than a decade to construct, 
cost more than a million dollars, and utilize immense resources (Oliomogbe 
and Smith 618).  Mega-development projects must adhere to national and 
international laws,  which require nonaffi l iated third parties  to appraise 
and address potential  r isks of the project (Kumaraswamy 54-55). 
 However, mega-development projects are often seen as controversial 
and are understood to be “realistically non-viable,” meaning that these projects 
are marketed as feasible but may not come to fruition without significant environmental, 
economic, and social costs. Additionally, due to their political nature, these 
projects may not serve the “best interest of the public” (Oliomogbe and Smith 
618-619). Too often these infrastructure projects are not properly assessed and 
overseen, resulting in the violation of human and environmental laws and 
rights. This violation leads to the hyper-marginalization of already marginalized 
communities and the degradation of the environment within the host state 
(Ishizawa 59-60). Therefore, the rise in foreign-funded mega-development 
projects has a direct correlation to the economically-dependent positions of 
postcolonial countries.
Historical and Cultural Context
 Indigenous Peoples and their Rights: Indigenous peoples in Latin America 
have a history of resistance to the exclusion they have faced, beginning with colonial 
rule and continuing with postcolonial practices. Indigenous rights movements 
have generally been “rooted in the struggle for identity, representation, and 
cultural reproductions, as well as control over resources” (Larson 228). Until 
recently, indigenous demands have been ignored or branded as obstacles to 
“contemporary development,” but international advancements for indigenous 
rights, headed by indigenous voices in the United Nations and other international 
legal entities, have sparked conversations and studies on indigenous rights 
(Stocks 89-91). These studies culminated in the United Nations’ adoption of 
the  Declarat ion on the  Rights  of  Indigenous Peoples  in  2007.  The United 
Nat ions  ident i f i es  indigenous  peoples  as  having  “his tor ica l  cont inui ty 
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with pre-colonial…societ ies ,”  maintaining a “strong link to territories and 
surrounding natural resources,” having “distinct social, economic, or political systems…
[and]  dis t inct  language,  cul ture ,  and bel iefs ,”  “form[ing]  non-dominant 
groups of society,” and “resolv[ing] to maintain and reproduce their ancestral 
environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities” (“Who are 
Indigenous Peoples?”). 
 However, indigenous rights are not consistently upheld as “it takes 
more than paragraphs in a document to change 500 years of colonial and 
postcolonial practice” (Stocks 86). Despite the binding ratification of the 
Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, which states that 
indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted prior to any developmental 
plans related to their land, the pursuit of neoliberal development routinely leads to 
the appropriation of indigenous land in violation of the Convention.
 History of Chile and the Mapuche: Chile’s development goals have excluded 
the indigenous Mapuche populations (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2-5). Comprising 
10% of Chile’s population, the Mapuche are the third largest indigenous group 
in South America, numbering 1.2 million people (Nesti, “The Mapuche” 2). The 
Mapuche were historically a nomadic people who migrated in accordance with the 
seasons and the availability of resources; thus, many aspects of their culture 
are based on their relationship with native forests, forest spirits, and communal 
land rights (Cosgrove, “Who Will” 7-8). Their ecological knowledge is therefore vast 
but largely misunderstood outside of their communities (Herrmann 392-394). 
 Indeed, the Mapuche have faced various forms of racial, political, and 
economic discrimination since the formation of the Republic of Chile. Around 
79% of the Mapuche population has been forced to leave the countryside and 
abandon their traditional lifestyles for economic opportunity in the cities 
(Cosgrove,  “Leadership” 118) .  These  migrat ions  to  urban centers  have 
decreased the number of Mapuche maintaining traditional ways of life. Postcolonial 
racial tensions and economic policies commonly result in the assimilation of Mapuche, 
leaving the few Mapuche who do fight for indigenous rights buried in poverty.
 The fact that the Mapuche were conquered by the Chilean nation rather 
than the Spanish Empire has shaped the Mapuche view of the Chilean state as 
a colonial power and subjugator of their people. In the early twentieth century, 
Chi lean governments  dis tr ibuted stolen Mapuche land to  forestry  and 
agricul tural  enterprises that pushed the Mapuche into less than 5% of their 
original land. The presidencies of Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende from 
1964 to 1973 restored 172,000 acres of Mapuche land, but the military coup 
and subsequent regime of General Pinochet halted this restoration. 
 In 1979, Pinochet enacted decree 2.568, which opened Mapuche lands 
to privatization through subsidies, tax breaks, and land concessions in order 
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to break up tradit ional  communities and attract  investments in Chile’s 
t imber industry. The regime tried to force Mapuche to identify as Chileans 
and assimilate into Chilean culture. One effort in assimilation was the limiting 
of indigenous landowners to no more than fifteen acres, which effectively 
dismantled their traditional nomadic lifestyles (Carruthers and Rodriguez 5). 
This discrimination and retraction of Maphuche rights continued until 1993, 
when the return of democracy allowed the Aylwin administration to sign the 
Indigenous Law, which gave the Mapuche the minimal right of legal recognition 
as an indigenous group (Nesti, “The Mapuche” 13).
  The Chilean Indigenous Law of 1993 also created an indigenous fund 
for land redistribution and economic development. These funds were accompanied 
by the establishment of the National Indigenous Development Corporation 
(CONADI), a legal entity responsible for enforcing the Indigenous Law and 
supporting indigenous development. The corporation board is made up of 17 
members, eight of which are elected by indigenous communities (Tomaselli 
158). The creation of CONADI appeared to be a politically responsible move 
by the Aylwin administration, but it forced the Mapuche to adapt to a modern 
democratic political system that did not align with their spiritual leadership 
and traditional community hierarchical systems (Nesti, “Indigenous Peoples” 
119). Additionally, CONADI has been forced to concede many cases related to 
land, water, and political participation rights “if they adversely affect state 
priorities and macro-economic plans” (Cosgrove, “Leadership” 119). These 
unsuitable approaches to settling agreements with the Mapuche persisted and 
climaxed with the controversial construction of the Hydroelectric Ralco Dam.
 History of Nicaragua and the Rama: The state of Nicaragua was established 
in 1838 following over 300 years of colonization by the Spanish and British 
(Sánchez 10-11). However, the territory along the Atlantic Coast was not 
conquered during the fifteenth century Spanish invasions and remained fairly 
autonomous under British protectorate rule until 1893 when the Nicaraguan president 
José Santos Zelaya annexed the Atlantic Coast under the central Nicaraguan 
government (Rivera). During this  t ime,  the  Nicaraguan government  f i rs t 
a l lowed transnat ional  corporat ions ,  backed by United States  funding,  to 
exploit the Atlantic Coast’s natural resources (Rivera). In 1979, the Sandinista 
government took power with a socialist vision of uniting all of Nicaragua 
through assimilatory, nationalistic policies. This vision of ethnic unity caused 
an indigenous counterrevolution, a separate counterrevolution from the United 
States-backed, anti-socialist Contra militant groups. The combination of the 
two counterrevolutions against the Sandinista government eventually ended 
in negotiations for ceasefire with government recognition of ethnic diversity 
in indigenous and Afro-descendant communities as one of the outcomes (Sánchez 11-12). 
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 The end of the counterrevolution and subsequent negotiations paved 
the way for Nicaragua’s 1987 Constitution, which included the Autonomy 
Law responsible for granting the Northern and Southern Caribbean regions 
the right to self-administration and natural resources (Stocks 88; Sánchez 11-
12; Larson 230-232).  Currently, the North Caribbean Coast Autonomous 
Region (RACCN) and South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region (RACCS) 
remain vir tual ly  independent  of  the  central  government  with  l i t t le  to  no 
basic  infrastructure  connecting the Western and Eastern Nicaraguan coasts. 
The two autonomous regions make up more than 50% of Nicaragua; however, 
only ten percent of the population lives in these regions (Sánchez 10). 
 These autonomous regions are also home to the majority of Nicaragua’s 
indigenous and Afro-descendant populations (Larson 230) .  Numbering 
only a few hundred, the Rama people are one of the recognized and protected 
indigenous groups on the Atlantic Coast who have a communal land title to 
4,843 square ki lometers (Ortiz 48;  Liedel) .  The east  and west  coasts  of  the 
country communicate so rarely that  the Rama, as well  as  other indigenous 
and Afro-descendant groups, still refer to those who live on the East Coast 
as “the Spaniards” (Johnson). The Rama are considered the “Guardians of the 
Forest” and remain strongly connected with the rainforest and their sacred 
sites (Paija). The Rama maintain their livelihoods through traditional means 
of subsistence and transportation (Liedel; Paija). Because of their historical 
exposure to different languages, the Rama are able to communicate in Spanish, 
English, and some of their native language1  (Paija). Unfortunately, due to their 
isolation and small population, there is little research has been conducted on 
the Rama way of life.
Risks of Mega-Development
 Free,  prior,  and informed consultation is  required by law for al l 
act ions involving indigenous territory in both Chile and Nicaragua; however, 
both states have chosen to abuse state power to pursue foreign-funded 
projects dependent on the relocation and assimilation of indigenous communities 
and the exploitation of natural resources. Both the Ralco Hydroelectric Dam 
and the Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal demonstrate that rule of law is often 
disregarded “when the interests of powerful domestic elites and transnational 
corporations collude to achieve a particular development objective” (Orellana 
10). Both mega-development projects were approved due to the prioritization 
of state and foreign economic and political interests.  As a result of the 
prioritization, the presidential administrations of both Chile and Nicaragua 
employed their control over state elites to circumvent national laws protecting 
indigenous r ights .  This  pol i t ica l  technique is  a  recent  manifestat ion of  a 
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long-term postcolonial practice: government-led internal colonization of the 
Pehuenche in Chile and the Rama in Nicaragua. In this sense, postcolonialism 
refers to the climate that encouraged the Chilean and Nicaraguan government 
to adhere to Eurocentric methods of development. 
 Chile and The Ralco Dam: In 1994, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad 
(ENDESA), a multinational electricity company announced a six-dam project 
along the BíoBío River (Lindsey 75). Four of these dams were to be located 
along the upper BíoBío on indigenous land claimed and owned by the 
Pehuenche,  a subgroup of  the Mapuche (Aylwin 5) .  The Pangue Dam, the 
f irst  of  the six-dam project ,  began construction in 1990 and was completed in 
1994. Pangue is said to have flooded 1,200 acres, which forced the relocation of 
at least 100 Pehuenche. Because the approval for the dam was granted prior to 
the ratification of the 1993 Indigenous Law, the Pehuenche had no say in the 
construction of the dam, and little research exists about how its construction 
impacted the environment and surrounding local communities. Additionally, 
Pangue also preceded the passing of the Environmental Law in 1993, which 
would have required the creation of an Environmental Impact Assessment as well as approval 
from the National Commission on Environment prior to construction (Lindsey 76).
 The Pangue dam was meant to function as part of a two-dam hydropeaking 
system and could only become fully effective following the construction of its 
sister dam, Ralco (Aylwin 6). The Ralco dam would retain water in a large reservoir 
and release water into Pangue’s lower reservoir depending on electricity demands, 
creating an artificial flow fluctuation, whereas Pangue would release water 
at a consistent rate (Person 15-18). The linkage between the Pangue and Ralco 
dams was kept from the Chilean public and stakeholders until  after the 
construction of Pangue (Lindsey 76). The Ralco Dam is situated 27 kilometers 
north of the Pangue Dam and had an investment of $500 million with the 
capacity to generate 570 megawatts of power. Additionally, the dam flooded 
an area of 8,650 acres, seven times the size of Pangue (Aylwin 6). The two 
sister dams produce some 12% of Chile’s national electricity. The Ralco dam 
was built in the span of seven years from 1996 to 2003 (Lindsey 77-78). 
  The passing of the Indigenous Law and the Environmental Law 
in 1993 meant that the process of approval for the Ralco Dam had to adhere to 
new social and environmenta l  s tandards .  Though both  laws  passed ,  the 
central government rendered them ineffective. The Indigenous Law mandated 
that indigenous lands could not be sold to non-indigenous owners without the 
approval of CONADI who refused to allow the sale of indigenous Pehuenche 
lands to ENDESA. As a result of this stance, two Mapuche CONADI directors 
were f ired by the Chilean president,  and a non-indigenous director was 
appointed,  and subsequently approved the sale (Lindsey 79) . 
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The 1993 Environmental Law required that ENDESA submit an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), which would then be approved by an independent source. 
Even though EIAs did not become legally mandatory until 1997, ENDESA did 
agree to carry out an environmental assessment, which was then rejected by 
more than 20 public  agencies that  analyzed the proposal’s  compliance 
with the law. The 20 rejections of the environmental assessment were overruled 
by President Frei’s administration, and the mega-development project was 
cleared for construction (Aylwin 8-9).
 The Pehuenche were not notified of the plan to construct a second dam 
until the concession for the mega-development project  and the sale of 
Pehuenche land had been  approved.  ENDESA,  now f ree  to  barga in  for 
Pehuenche  land,  created the Pehuen Foundation as a bargaining chip. The 
Pehuen Foundation aimed to work with Pehuenche communities to develop 
social and economic programs that focused on tourism, artisan goods, and 
community infrastructure. Additionally, ENDESA conducted individual consultations 
that offered families new land, houses, employment, monetary compensation, 
and alcohol (Aylwin 9). Many of the Pehuenche state that they were promised 
compensation verbally, a culturally trusted method of communication. However, 
these verbal promises were not reflected in the contracts they signed, which 
went unnoticed by many Pehuenche who did not know how to read (Radwin). The 
manipulation of information resulted in the majority of Pehuenche families signing 
away their land. Of the 675 residents that had to be relocated, 500 were Pehuenche, 
and seven families refused all negotiations with ENDESA. In April of 2002, 
however, President Lagos approved the Commission of Good Men, which 
assigned a value to the remaining Pehuenche land and gave ENDESA the right 
to forcefully buy the land from the seven families (Lindsey 77-78). Shortly 
after in 2003, the dam became operational.
 The Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal: In June of 2013, President Ortega 
signed Law 840 ,  the  Spec ia l  Law for  the  Development  o f  In f ras t ruc ture 
and Nicaraguan Transport  in relation to the Canal ,  Free Trade Zones,  and 
Associated Infrastructure. Law 840 gave Hong Kong Nicaraguan Development 
(HKND), a Chinese infrastructure development firm, the rights to finance, 
construct, and operate an interoceanic canal for 50 years with an additional 
renewable 50 years. The law allowed HKND to appropriate any land needed for the 
canal, even if the land was not on the canal route, giving HKND the right to appropriate 
indigenous and environmentally protected land (Acosta, “El Impacto” 1-2). 
 The Nicaraguan Canal is projected to cost $40 billion and will be the 
largest earth-moving mega-development project to date (Condit 1). Stretching 
278 kilometers long, the canal will  be three times the length of the Panama 
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Canal. The proposed depth and width of the canal would make the locks 
10 meters  deeper and 28 meters wider than the expansions being made in 
Panama (Conti  70) .  Furthermore,  the  waterway through Lake Nicaragua 
needs to  have a  depth of  27 .6  meters ,  but  s ince  Lake Nicaragua only  has 
a depth of 15 meters, excessive dredging will be required in order to accommodate 
larger ships (Conti 70).
 Almost the entire Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is comprised of legally recognized 
and protected indigenous territory.  In 1987,  Nicaragua recognized the 
Constitutional Articles 5, 89, and 180, which recognized indigenous communities 
and guaranteed these communities the right to develop in ways that maintain 
their culture, language, and any form of communal land ownership. Law 28, the 
Statute of Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, recognized 
regional autonomy, and Law 445, Law of Communal Ownership of Indigenous Peoples 
and Ethnic Communities of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast of 
Nicaragua and of the Rivers Boca, Coco, Indio, and Maíz, gave indigenous 
and ethnic communities the right to legal representation and participation (Acosta, “El 
Impacto” 6-7). Additionally, these indigenous lands could not be legally sold or seized 
under the concept of “pueblos originarios,” or original communities recognized by the 
government in 2014 (Acosta, “El Impacto” 7). Though these laws supposedly protect 
the rights of indigenous communities, the Nicaraguan government signed the 
concession to HKND prior to consulting with environmental and indigenous 
groups. Law 840 states that even the consent of previous laws such as Law 
28 and 445 “no serán requeridos para El Proyecto o Sub-proyecto,” which 
translates to “are not required for the canal project or its sub-projects,” thus 
rendering the laws inert (Acosta, “El Impacto” 9). 
 International standards from the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous 
Rights, Convention 169, and the American Convention on Human Rights, all 
of which have been signed and ratified by Nicaragua, mandate that development 
projects that impact indigenous lands must have free, prior, and informed 
consultations before any concession is made (Acosta, “El Impacto” 9-11). 
However, public consultations were only made after the passing of the law 
in  mid-2014 af ter  the  desired route  for  the  canal  had been establ ished 
(“Publ ic  Consultations Overview” 1-2). HKND and the Nicaraguan government 
argued that accurate consultations could not be made until the route was 
decided (Acosta, “El Impacto” 10-11). Public consultations only occurred in 
six public centers: San Miguelito, New Guinea, Bluefields, Polo de Desarrollo, 
Rivas, Isla de Ometepe and Managua, and did not target the local populations 
that lived along the canal route. 
 The consultations about the canal began on July 21, 2014 and lasted for nine days 
(“Public Consultations Overview” iv). The Public Consultations Overview, released 
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by HKND, states that stakeholders attending the consultations felt there was a lack 
of detailed information especially in relation to construction procedures. One attendee 
from Managua suggested that consultations should “expose the negative 
impacts of the Project, not only the favorable points” (“Public Consultations 
Overview” 20). Additionally, there were complaints that “[attendee] questions 
were not answered clearly, and that the event should have taken place much earlier, not 
when the concession had already been granted” (“Public Consultations Overview” 16).
 With 52% of  the  canal  route  encroaching on indigenous terr i tory, 
many indigenous communities have taken legal action (“International Human 
Rights Clinic joins fight”). More than 30 concerned groups, ranging from indigenous 
communities to environmental groups, filed complaints immediately after the law was 
passed to the Supreme Court of Nicaragua (Meyer 3). However, the Supreme 
Court dismissed all the challenges on the basis that Law 840 was passed “with 
a wide majority and because the major development project took precedence” 
(Liedel). In June, 2014, Dr. María Luisa Acosta, an indigenous human rights 
lawyer for the Rama, filed a complaint to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) who then issued a request to the Nicaraguan government for 
proof of adequate consultations with local and indigenous communities (Liedel). The 
date by which the Nicaraguan government must respond has remained confidential. 
 The canal  route  exi ts  into  the  Atlant ic  Ocean,  b isect ing the  Rama 
terr i tory.  The traditional Rama village of Bangkukuk Tai, home to the last 
fifteen native Rama speakers, will be destroyed for the construction of a 
deep-water port (Acosta, “Análisis” 7-8). The construction and operation of 
the canal  wil l  have widespread and unknown impacts on the rest  of  the 
territory.  With fewer than 1,500 Rama remaining, these potential impacts 
could completely shatter their way of life. The canal would cut off northern 
and southern Rama communities, who, with their traditional wooden canoes 
and motorboats, would be unable to cross the port, severing communal ties 
(Baldi 38). Despite HKND and government claims to break ground in late 
2016, no information has been revealed about compensation and relocation 
plans for the Rama or for other indigenous, Afro-descendent, and Nicaraguan 
communities that will be affected by the canal. 
 Impact on Indigenous Peoples: Though Latin America is home to approximately 40 
million indigenous peoples who belong to almost 600 indigenous groups, the region has a 
history of indifference to, and oppression of, indigenous needs where states “deliberately 
discouraged the formation of ethnic consciousness…as a part of the nation-building 
process”; additionally, exclusionary practices and discriminatory social discourses have 
deterred indigenous peoples from identifying as indigenous (“Indigenous Peoples in Latin 
America“; Madrid 33). These mega-development projects pose a greater threat to indigenous 
communities due to a collective history of colonialism that indigenous communities 
share as they are repeatedly made invisible and oppressed by postcolonial practices. 
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 “La tierra no le pertenece a una persona, sino que las personas, como 
conjunto, pertenecen a la tierra, que los acoje y alimenta” (“Ralco le cambio la 
vida de los Pehuenches”). This translates to “the earth does not belong to one 
person, but the people as a whole belong to the land that it hosts and feeds.” 
The land taken from the Pehuenche and the land that could be taken from the 
Rama signifies more than just property. Indigenous peoples’ identity and spirituality 
hinges on their relationship with the land and resources; if removed from 
their land, indigenous peoples lose the foundation of everything that makes 
them who they are. In the case of both the Ralco Dam and the Interoceanic 
Canal, the impacts on the indigenous communities cannot be assessed without 
a comprehensive understanding of the environmental impacts on indigenous 
land (Antkowiak). Because the environmental impact assessments for both 
projects were deemed inadequate, either by review agencies or by national 
and foreign environmentalists, the impacts on the land and, by extension, on 
indigenous culture are impossible to measure.
  In preparation for the construction of the Ralco Hydroelectric 
Dam, the Pehuenche were given the choice of relocating to three different 
communities by ENDESA: El Barco, El Huachi, and Santa Laura (“Ralco le 
cambio la vida de los Pehuenches”). El Barco is situated 1,000 meters above 
sea level and is covered with snow for the majority of the year; El Huachi has 
no traditional forests and therefore impedes indigenous traditional lifestyles; 
the last location, Santa Laura, is located 85 kilometers away from the other 
communities and would further distance the Pehuenche families from each other 
(Nesti, “Indigenous Peoples” 128-133). The Pehuenche were eventually relocated 
to El Barco as a part of ENDESA’s relocation plan, which “included a new house 
with electricity for each family on land appraised for more than the property 
they had lost, farm animals and a corral to hold them, as well as a small, open-top 
hut for keeping a continuous fire” (Radwin). 
 More than a decade later, many Pehuenche are still waiting for ENDESA 
to compensate them for the loss of their land. Promises of free electricity, new 
community infrastructure, and continued assistance on behalf of ENDESA 
have not been fulfilled. Furthermore, the houses where the Pehuenche were 
relocated are equipped with modern, Western amenities such as electricity and running 
water, forcing indigenous families to abandon their traditional lifestyles (Radwin). The 
community is witnessing a decrease in cultural practices due to the difficulty of pursuing 
traditional ways of life. Even if the Pehuenche wished to travel down to the Ralco reservoir, 
ENDESA and the Chilean government have made the area surrounding the dam and 
reservoirs private, denying indigenous communities access to the land (Aylwin 12). The 
Rama face a predicament similar to the Pehuenche. While no concrete information has 
been released about relocation or compensation policies, the Rama can expect to be 
subject to similar conditions of land dispossession and poor compensation. 
105
Policy Recommendations
 International Multilateral  Institutions and International Civil  Society 
Organizations :  “Who’s going to do it? We have no money.” These are the words 
of Dr. María Luisa Acosta, a renowned Nicaraguan attorney who represents 
the Rama and other indigenous groups in the fight against the Nicaraguan 
Interoceanic Canal. This was Acosta’s response when I asked her if she believed 
that local resistance could stop the construction of the canal. Despite significant 
dissent in the country to the construction of the canal, the protesters are unable 
to influence Ortega’s government, and Acosta’s response highlights the gap 
between indigenous peoples and the state government that international multilateral 
institutions and civil society could fill. 
 This gap represents the top-down strategy for indigenous empowerment, a 
strategy which calls on influential international actors and entities to open the 
way for indigenous empowerment. While the push for indigenous rights must 
originate from the bottom, powerful  international  bodies should support 
advances and ally with indigenous movements. “In the future, governments 
will  be more accountable [for circumventing law] and can be exposed for 
corruption” (Antkowiak and Carozza). Responsibility for defending human, 
indigenous, and environmental rights can now fall to “international human rights 
bodies, multilateral institutions…and even non-governmental organizations” 
(Bryan 222) “as indigenous rights and agendas…are now incorporated within 
development policies and projects of the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the  European Union,  and numbers  of  b i lateral  a id 
agencies”  (Andol ina 2) .  In Chile, domestic and international attention on 
the Ralco Dam brought about political and social tension and pressure, and 
a friendly settlement courtesy of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights mandated that the Chilean government adopt policies and promises to 
protect indigenous peoples and their resources. 
 In Nicaragua, the canal project has been temporarily detained, in part by the 
loss of funding, but also due to the protests occurring along the proposed canal route 
and in the international arena. This dissent has triggered a reaction in the international 
community, significant enough that the Inter-American Commission and Court have 
begun to hold seminars about potential environmental and human rights violations. 
In the future, international pressure can help to ensure that future projects do not go 
unregulated. These forms of international pressure are known as the chief techniques 
and resources of international civil society organizations and multilateral institutions. 
In this unique space, multilateral international institutions and international civil society 
organizations provide top-down support to secure indigenous rights while monitoring 
government actions and ensuring that national and international laws are not broken.
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 The rise of indigenous civil society organizations has been coupled 
with an increased collaboration with international legal institutions. In 2001, for 
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) ruled in favor 
for the case of Awas Tinghi Mayagna, an indigenous group in Nicaragua. This 
landmark decision internationally recognized the cultural and historical ties 
indigenous communities have to their land as “a material and spiritual element 
which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit 
it to future generations” (Hooker 304). 
 These international institutions and organizations have given indigenous 
movements access to “material resources and media access of international 
networks” (Fischer 3). This avenue has provided the indigenous movements 
with a source of international media attention in support of their fight for 
justice and recognition in international human rights courts. In February 2016, 
another indigenous community won a human rights case through the IACHR. 
Bauxite mining, undertaken by foreign corporations with state permission, had 
invaded the Kaliña and Lokono indigenous communities’ territory in Suriname. 
 The IACHR ruled that the state of Suriname must “delimit, demarcate, 
and t i t le”  the  indigenous land on the  basis  of  an American Convention 
of Human Rights violation (“Indigenous Peoples in Latin America”). In recent 
years, renowned and respected legal institutions such as IACHR have evolved 
their jurisprudence to include indigenous rights, which has set a precedent for how 
state governments must interact with indigenous communities.  However, 
multilateral institutions and civil society organizations of Eurocentric origin 
must be aware of their approach to assisting indigenous communities as they 
risk being “influenced by the culture and political climate in which they [are 
based]” and unknowingly perpetuating postcolonial attitudes (Cosgrove, 
“Leadership” 128).  In order to justly approach the multifaceted dilemma 
indigenous peoples face, these multilateral institutions and civil  society 
organizations must reflect  on their  own posit ionality,  not  only on their 
origins in metropole states,  but also on their  own posit ion of  power as 
international  representatives of indigenous movements. 
 These international actors endanger indigenous peoples if they authenticate 
the exclusion and marginalization of indigenous peoples in their actions and 
court rulings, effectively dismantling the intent of the top-down strategy. 
Additionally, international organizations that claim to represent indigenous 
interests abroad may misinterpret the indigenous struggle. For example, 
Western-educated individuals tend to share the belief that indigenous communities 
wish to remain in stasis  and are not  interested in development.  I t  isn’t 
“backwardness,” however, that makes many tribal peoples reject mega-development 
pro jec ts  and other  Eurocentr i c  not ions  o f  deve lopmenta l  progress ,  but 
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rather a collective historical fear of forced dependency on powerful elites 
and continued marginalization (Corry). Such misinterpretations demonstrate 
that international organizations operating across periphery and metropole 
borders must remain aware of how they present both themselves and the 
exploited peoples they represent and empower. When international institutions 
and civil societies consciously avoid postcolonial bias, they can be crucial allies 
in the struggle for indigenous recognition and rights in the international arena. 
Conclusion: Bottom-Up and Top-Down: Pathways to Indigenous 
Empowerment and the Rule of Law
 
 As demonstrated in Chile, the loss of their land forces indigenous communities 
to surrender their traditional ways of life. The ENDESA Relocation Plan for 
the Pehuenche devastated their cultural wealth through forced relocation and 
introduction into a Eurocentric  l i festyle.  Despite the risk of  depleting 
indigenous cultural wealth and natural resources, Chile and Nicaragua have 
continued to pursue destructive mega-development projects. The Nicaraguan 
Interoceanic Canal has the potential to irreparably affect Rama land as well 
as a multitude of other indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, all of 
which possess distinct cultural wealth. These mega-development projects all 
market an illusion of progress wherein communities who do not conform become 
byproducts of neoliberal economic development. Discourses that challenge dominant 
Eurocentric development paradigms should encourage greater respect for 
indigenous peoples. This empowerment and acknowledgement would constitute a 
bottom-up strategy to combat future marginalization and confront normalized 
neoliberal development structures. 
  Bottom-up indigenous empowerment can only be achieved with 
support from top-down international multilateral institutions and civil society 
organizations. These institutions and organizations are crucial in creating a space, 
domestically and internationally, in which indigenous empowerment can occur 
without government interference. In addition to providing a governable 
space for indigenous communities such as the Rama and Pehuenche, these 
multilateral institutions and civil society organizations may also grant indigenous 
movements a wider audience through international advocacy. 
 International legal institutions in particular have the ability to evolve 
jurisprudence in favor of indigenous rights. Should international human rights 
courts rule that the Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal violates the rights of indigenous 
peoples, it could force Nicaragua to terminate the project or find a way to 
appease indigenous demands. This ruling could also send a clear message 
that infrastructure projects must abide by national and international laws, 
including laws regarding indigenous rights. 
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 Indigenous empowerment  must  be  real ized from the bottom-up. 
Ini t ia l  reactions to states circumventing laws tend to jump straight to 
demands of indigenous political representation. However, as seen with the 
Mapuche legal entity,  CONADI,  polit ical  representation is  ineffective i f 
indigenous peoples lack outside support from fellow citizens, the state, and 
the international community. Instituting indigenous political representation 
without this  bottom-up foundation risks engaging in multiculturalism 
wherein indigenous representatives become puppets for indigenous public 
appeasement with no real power. This support begins with creating a strong foundation 
that utilizes indigenous knowledge as a vehicle for empowerment and recognition.
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1 Only 23 fluent Rama speakers remain (Paija).
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